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This article is written from within the Catholic, and more particularly the Augustinian/ Thomist 
tradition of moral theology. It analyses the response of the Catholic Magisterium to the prospect of 
germline-genetic engineering (GGE). This is a very new issue and the Church has little definitive 
teaching on it. The statements of Popes and Vatican congregations or commissions have not settled 
the key questions. An analysis of theological themes drawn from secular writers points beyond 
pragmatic safety considerations towards intrinsic ethical limits to GGE. Given the impossibility of 
identifying would-have-been-created persons who would be ‘treated’ by this intervention, altering 
the human genome for the sake of future generations cannot be regarded as ‘therapy’. Further 
theological considerations suggest that GGE may not be morally permissible, even in the case of 
identifiable genetic diseases. This is an area where more theological reflection is needed.   
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Germ-line genetic engineering: a critical look at current Roman Catholic teaching 
This article is written from within the Roman Catholic, and more particularly the Augustinian/ 
Thomist tradition of moral theology. It acknowledges the authority of teaching office of the Roman 
Catholic Church, sometimes termed the ‘Magisterium’. This is constituted by the bishops of the 
Church in communion with the bishop of Rome. On some specific matters of faith and morals, the 
Magisterium has settled definitively the limits of orthodox doctrine. The obvious examples of this 
are the creeds of the ancient Church. On matters that are not as yet defined doctrine (de fide) the 
current teaching of the Magisterium remains weighty and worthy of respect. However, it may be 
mistaken in some respects and may need to develop through internal theological criticism.  
The ethics of germ-line genetic engineering (GGE) is a case in point. This is a very new issue and the 
Church has little definitive teaching on it. The present paper aims to demonstrate that GGE demands 
a more thorough-going theological analysis than has yet occurred within the Catholic community. 
Two theological themes are then explored that suggest intrinsic ethical limits in this area and not 
only pragmatic safety considerations. The work of serious Catholic theological reflection on GGE has 
hardly begun, but the preliminary considerations presented in this paper suggest that altering the 
human genome for the sake of future generations is inherently morally unacceptable, even in the 
case of identifiable genetic diseases.   
1. Unease among the nations   
The prospect of GGE has engendered widespread unease. One commentator has even gone so far as 
to characterise it as a ‘potential weapon of mass destruction’ (Annas et al 2002, p. 173). It is an issue 
that poses ‘unprecedented concerns’ (Andorno 2002) for the human race: For it has the potential to 
reshape the human species as a whole. There are a number of ‘transhumanists’ who are explicitly in 
favour of seeking to transform humanity into a new and better species, a superman. While a few are 
attracted to this dream, to most people the clear echoes of Nazi eugenics make it an appalling vision, 
and it is perhaps for this reason that a number of countries and international bodies have prohibited 
absolutely all attempts at GGE.  
This issue was first debated at a European level in relation to biotechnology patents. An attempt to 
extend patent protection for biotechnology in 1988 foundered in the European parliament because 
it did not include ethical limits. When the proposed directive was reintroduced in 1995 it succeeded 
only because certain areas were explicitly excluded from patentability. These included: 
Processes for the modifying the germ line genetic identity of human beings (Article 6, 2 (b)) 
At the same time as the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers were discussing GGE in 
relation to patentability, a different European body, the Council of Europe was drawing up a 
Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine. This was opened for signing in 1997. It included the 
following article on genetic engineering in humans:  
Article 13. An intervention seeking to modify the human genome may only be undertaken for 
preventive, diagnostic or therapeutic purposes and only if its aim is not to introduce any modification 
in the genome of any descendants. [emphasis added] 
Note that this article allows gene therapy on an existing person for the sake of prevention, diagnosis 
or treatment of disease (so called ‘somatic gene therapy’). What is expressly prohibited is any 
attempt to introduce a modification in the genes of future persons. This is prohibited even when the 
modification aims at the prevention of disease. Existing persons may be treated but future persons 
are not to be reshaped even for the sake of their own health.  
The same year as the European Convention was opened for ratification, the general conference of 
the United Nations Science and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) endorsed a Universal Declaration on 
the Human Genome and Human Rights. This identifies ‘germ-line interventions’ as practices that 
‘could be contrary to human dignity’ (Article 24).  
In addition to these international moves, a number of nation states, including France, Germany, 
India, South Korea, and South Africa have enacted national legislation to prohibit GGE. (IBHF 2009)  
There is thus an impressive list of international instruments and national legislation opposing GGE. 
However it should be noticed that the UNESCO declaration has no legal force and, in any case, it 
does not prohibit or even condemn the practice unequivocally. The declaration only suggests that 
this is one area that ‘could be contrary to human dignity’ [emphasis added] so that UNESCO requires 
further guidance from its International Bioethics Committee. The directive on patentability may 
inhibit investment into certain areas of biotechnology but it does not prohibit the development of 
such technologies. In contrast, the Council of Europe’s Convention on Human Rights and 
Biomedicine is legally binding for those who ratify it, and to date it has been ratified by twenty-six 
countries. It remains the most significant international instrument prohibiting GGE.  
In some countries (such as Belgium) there is an explicit prohibition on clinical interventions of a 
‘eugenic ‘kind. However, these are defined as ‘the selection or amplification of non-pathological 
genetic characteristics’ [emphasis added]. The same distinction is made in the UN Declaration where 
it is said that ‘research affecting his or her genome may only be carried out for his or her direct 
health benefit’. Hence, interventions of direct health benefit, to prevent pathological genetic 
characteristics, are effectively permitted. The Belgian legislation is intended to support the practice 
of embryo selection (Pre-implantation Genetic Diagnosis) for pathological genetic conditions. 
However, the same logic would seem to support GGE for the same conditions, if this could be done 
safely.  
In the United Kingdom the genetic selection of embryos is permitted under licence from the Human 
Fertilisation and Embryology Authority. The current law (Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 
2008, section 3ZA (5)) prohibits the implanting into a woman of a human embryo that has been 
genetically modified. However, there is no prohibition on genetically modifying human embryos for 
research purposes, if this is done under licence and the embryos are not implanted. Furthermore, 
implantation of a genetically modifying human embryos could be licenced if this is to address 
mitochondrial disease. Thus GGE to avoid these conditions is legal, in principle, in the UK.  
Even among those countries that have prohibited all GGE or the creating of genetically modified 
human embryos for all purposes, several have done so explicitly for reasons of safety and ‘in the 
present state of knowledge’ (South Africa, and similarly India). By implication, as science and 
technology make progress and safety fears are ameliorated then GGE will become more acceptable.  
The state of international law and public policy in this area is thus not uniform. On the one hand 
there are very widespread concerns about the potential of this technology to be abused and there is 
a near universal consensus that, at present, the technology is not safe. Nevertheless, this consensus 
is compatible with a conditional acceptance of the technology if and when it becomes safe, and the 
United Kingdom has already made legal provision for GGE for mitochondrial disease. On the other 
hand there seems to be a feeling among some people, strong in some countries but not universal 
shared, that there is a deeper, intrinsic, problem with GGE. The UNESCO declaration alludes to this in 
asking whether GGE might be ‘contrary to human dignity’. Nevertheless, governments and courts 
have struggled to articulate the alleged character of this deeper objection and it has not found 
general support. In most countries of the world, including the United Kingdom and the United 
States, the legal position on GGE is based primarily on safety concerns reflecting the current state of 
research rather than on intrinsic ethical difficulties.  
2. The banal conventionality of official Catholic teaching in this area 
People who feel uneasy in relation to some new technology may well turn to religious perspectives, 
including that of the Catholic Church for an account of what, if anything, is supposed to be ethically 
problematic about it. However, an interested outsider or a Catholic who has misgivings about GGE 
will find very little that is original or interesting in the scattered official Catholic responses to the 
question. This is in contrast to questions about human sexuality, the body, or the inviolability of 
human life where the Magisterium has developed a rich theology rooted in the Scriptures and in the 
tradition. The Catholic Church, especially under John Paul II, has endeavoured not only to defend the 
institution of marriage and the sanctity of human life but has sought to deepen these issues by 
reflecting on what it is to be ‘one flesh’ with another person (Genesis 2.24) and what it is to be made 
in the ‘image of God’ (Genesis 1.27).  
In relation to genetic engineering such Scriptural and theological reflections are conspicuous by their 
absence.i Instead, Magisterial documents typically set out the conventional distinction between 
somatic and germ-line gene therapy and then express great caution about the latter. However, the 
reason for this caution is nothing more than the oft repeated safety worries related to the current 
state of scientific research. For example, the 2009 document on bioethical issues, Dignitas Personae, 
makes the following statement:  
‘The moral evaluation of germ line cell therapy is different. Whatever genetic modifications are 
effected on the germ cells of a person will be transmitted to any potential offspring. Because the 
risks connected to any genetic manipulation are considerable and as yet not fully controllable, in the 
present state of research, it is not morally permissible to act in a way that may cause possible harm 
to the resulting progeny. In the hypothesis of gene therapy on the embryo, it needs to be added that 
this only takes place in the context of in vitro fertilization and thus runs up against all the ethical 
objections to such procedures. For these reasons, therefore, it must be stated that, in its current 
state, germ line cell therapy in all its forms is morally illicit.’ (Dignitas Personae para 26) 
The first three sentences of this paragraph are so conventional they could have been taken from any 
number of national or international statements on this issue. Indeed they are strikingly similar to the 
law enacted by India in 2001 ‘Considering the present state of knowledge, germ-line therapy in 
humans shall be proscribed’ or that of South Africa in 2002: ‘There is, at present, insufficient 
knowledge to evaluate the risks, to future generations, of gene modification of the germ line. It is 
therefore recommended that gene modification of the human germ line should not yet be 
attempted.’ 
 The next two sentences are distinctive of recent Catholic teaching in bioethics, in that they express 
ethical criticisms of in vitro fertilisation (not made explicit in this paragraph but stated elsewhere in 
the same document). These criticisms refer first to the destruction of human embryos in the 
development and practice of IVF, and secondly to the way in which IVF takes place in the laboratory 
and circumvents rather than assists the sexual union of the couple. On the face of it neither of these 
points directly addresses the issue of whether there is something intrinsically wrong with seeking to 
control the genotype of a future person. In the absence of any such account the default seems to be 
that there is no essential difference between somatic and germ-line intervention and there would be 
no ethical objection to GGE if this could be achieved safely, without destroying embryos and without 
the need for in vitro fertilisation. 
On the basis of this document it has been argued that ‘should the current state change in the 
following two respects, 1) risks to progeny are reduced so as to be outweighed by likely therapeutic 
benefits, and 2) the subjects involved in the germ line therapy (either gametes or early stage 
embryos) do not affect persons coming into existence through a morally licit act (the conjugal act 
between a husband and wife), the [Catholic] Church’s position on germ line therapy would likely be 
that it is morally permissible.’ (Delaney 2009, p. 33) This last practical condition is imaginable in 
principle, for example, if the focus of gene therapy were the gamete-producing tissues – the testes 
or ovaries – with conception then occurring through sexual intercourse, without the use of IVF. 
The conditional acceptance of GGE in contemporary Catholic moral theology is made explicit in a 
document of the International Theological Commission. This body is not strictly speaking as an 
element of the Church’s Magisterium. Individual Catholics are not bound by its expressions of 
opinion. Nevertheless, where the commission has published a view on the Vatican’s own website 
and where this has not been criticised or corrected by the Magisterium then it can reasonably be 
understood as expression of Catholic belief that is acceptable to the Magisterium. On GGE the 
commission made the following statement:  
‘Germ line genetic engineering with a therapeutic goal in man would in itself be acceptable were it 
not for the fact that is it is hard to imagine how this could be achieved without disproportionate risks 
especially in the first experimental stage, such as the huge loss of embryos and the incidence of 
mishaps, and without the use of reproductive techniques. A possible alternative would be the use of 
gene therapy in the stem cells that produce a man’s sperm, whereby he can beget healthy offspring 
with his own seed by means of the conjugal act.’ (para 90) 
Nevertheless, this statement, and Delaney’s reading of Dignitas Personae, appears to be in some 
tension with a statement in an earlier Magisterial document, Donum Vitae:  
‘Certain attempts to influence chromosomic or genetic inheritance are not therapeutic but are aimed 
at producing human beings selected according to sex or other predetermined qualities. These 
manipulations are contrary to the personal dignity of the human being and his or her integrity and 
identity. Therefore in no way can they be justified on the grounds of possible beneficial 
consequences for future humanity. Every person must be respected for himself: in this consists the 
dignity and right of every human being from his or her beginning.’ (para 1.6 emphasis in the original)  
This declaration presupposes but does not explore an alleged link between genetics and the integrity 
and identity of the human person. The basis of this link and its relevance to theology will be 
examined later in this paper. This passage from Donum Vitae is invoked in the Universal Catechism: 
‘“Certain attempts to influence chromosomic or genetic inheritance are not therapeutic but are 
aimed at producing human beings selected according to sex or other predetermined qualities. Such 
manipulations are contrary to the personal dignity of the human being and his integrity and identity” 
which are unique and unrepeatable.’ (2275 emphasis in the original)  
One way to read this paragraph is as an absolute prohibition of GGE, on the basis that such 
interventions are not in themselves therapeutic, because they are not directed at living patients but 
at producing future persons with predetermined qualities. However the paragraph can also be read 
as referring only to manipulations concerned with ‘predetermined qualities’ that are non-
pathological, as in the Belgian legal definition of ‘eugenic’ interventions. This reading is supported by 
the document’s reference to the sex of the child as a prohibited criterion of selection. The attempt 
to correlate Dignitas Personae with Donum Vitae thus shows up an ambiguity in the earlier teaching. 
Did it intend to condemn all GGE or only that directed towards the eugenic selection of 
predetermined qualities (other than the correction of pathological conditions)?  
When one moves from the Magisterium to discussions by Catholic theologians a similar ambiguity is 
often present. A document by the working party of the Catholic Bishops Joint Committee on 
Bioethical Issues, working under the bishops of England and Wales, Ireland, and Scotland, was 
unable to identify any intrinsic problem with GGE. The report based its objections to GGE on the 
involvement of in vitro fertilisation, the concomitant destruction of human embryos, and the risks of 
genetic engineering for patients, given the current state of knowledge. ‘In principle such acceptable 
treatments could include germ-line gene therapy; however, in practice, germ-line therapy is likely to 
involve one or more of various morally unacceptable elements: use of in vitro fertilization or similar 
techniques, experimentation on embryos in the course of developing the therapy, discarding of 
embryos and abortion of foetuses on whom the therapy is unsuccessful, and the causing of excessive 
risks to the subject and to his or her descendants.’ (CBJCBI p. 42-43) 
Another document reflecting the views of Catholic theologians on this issue was the 2007 agreed 
statement of the International Association of Catholic Bioethics. According to this document: 
‘Gene therapies that affect or may affect the germ line or the reproductive cells of human beings, 
and have an impact on future generations, should not be pursued.’ (IACB 17c, p. 333) 
It is noteworthy that this bald assertion includes no rationale and no indication as to whether the 
prohibition is intended as something provisional, based on the precautionary principle and given the 
current state of research, or whether it is based on an intrinsic moral problem. A footnote indicates 
that at the meeting there was disagreement among theologians as to whether ‘an exception could 
be made if it were technically feasible to correct lethal genetic disorders like trisomy 18’ (footnote 
12, p. 333). This was admittedly of no immediate practical relevance, given the current state of 
knowledge, ‘but, in the future, [it] could be an emerging topic of discussion’ (p. 327). The fact that 
this was debated shows that at least some theologians present were supportive of GGE to prevent 
lethal genetic conditions, if this could be done safely and without the harms associated with IVF. On 
the other hand it also seems that some Catholic theologians present would not endorse GGE even in 
such a case. The ‘emerging topic of discussion’ is precisely whether there is an intrinsic moral 
problem such as would exclude GGE even when this would aim to prevent some clearly pathological 
condition.  
From a theological perspective what is perhaps most striking about all the responses to genetic 
engineering by the Magisterium and by some groups of Catholic theologians is the absence of 
theological analysis. The forty-five page report of the working party of the Catholic Bishops Joint 
Committee, for example, contains only five pages that are explicitly theological and the whole report 
contains not a single quotation from Scripture. The document of the International Theological 
Commission, referred to above, contains both Scriptural citation and theological analysis, but not in 
the paragraphs about genetic engineering. At that point the document reverts to weighing up risks 
and benefits. It is for this reason that these statements appear so thin, pedestrian and conventional. 
They add nothing theological to secular discussion of the question but seem, if anything, to draw on 
secular discussion. Hence they do not help people who might look to the Church for an articulation 
of some intrinsic problem with GGE.  
The poverty of explicitly theological analysis in the Roman Catholic response to genetic engineering 
should be set in the broader context of the current state of Catholic moral theology. This is shaped 
by the Second Vatican Council (1962-1965) which had set out to reform the Church in a number of 
ways. In relation to moral theology, the Council, called for it to be ‘nourished more on the teaching 
of the Bible, [it] should shed light on the loftiness of the calling of the faithful in Christ’ (Optatam 
totius 16). The implicit criticism of Catholic moral theology in the time before Vatican II was made 
explicit in a later document. ‘In the past, moral theology exhibited at times a certain narrowness of 
vision and some lacunas. This was due in large part to a kind of legalism, to an individualistic 
orientation, and to a separation from the sources of Revelation.’ (On the Formation of Future Priests, 
published 22 February 1976 by the Congregation for Catholic Education n. 96 quoted by Pinckaers 
1995) 
If theology is ‘separated from the sources of Revelation’ then it is scarcely theology at all, more an 
exercise in philosophical thinking.ii This is exactly what Catholic moral theology had become, and 
what, despite the Council, it sometimes remains, as Richard McCormick astutely observed: ‘Those 
who are concerned with concrete moral problems and a disciplined analysis of their solution say 
little about vision and character and the biblical-liturgical materials that nourish and sustain them. In 
other words, they act like moral philosophers’ (McCormick 1981, p.295; Jones 2008, p. 80). Genetic 
engineering is just such an example of the kind of concrete moral problem where the attempt at 
disciplined analysis has been separated from a richer theological vision.  
3. Scientists playing god 
While many contemporary Catholic moral theologians have contented themselves with discussions 
of the possible risks, benefits and harms (especially to the human embryo) of GGE, it is ironic that 
secular philosophers and scientists have frequently adverted to theological themes when discussing 
human genetics.  
One common theological motif among secular writers is that the discovery of genetics will give ‘god 
like’ powers or the corollary of this, that genetic engineering and selection involve ‘playing god’ with 
the lives of future generations. A good example of the former kind is proved by James Watson, co-
discoverer of the structure of DNA, ‘only with the discovery of the double helix and the ensuing 
genetic revolution have we had grounds for thinking that the powers held traditionally to be the 
exclusive property of the gods might one day be ours.’ (Highfield 2003) With these powers comes 
responsibility, but for a eugenicist like Watson, this is exercised precisely by intervening:  ‘I think it's 
irresponsible not to try and direct evolution to produce a human being who will be an asset to the 
world.’ (Darnovsky 2007) 
In 1977 the utilitarian philosopher Jonathan Glover confidently defended the view that not only 
abortion but also infanticide should be permitted for newborn infants with an ‘abnormality’ (the 
example he gave was spina bifida) (Glover 1977, p. 168). By 2001 he had become more cautious. 
Quoting a woman with spina bifida who was happy to be alive, he ponders, ‘Is anyone in a position 
to make the Godlike judgement:  “It would have been better if you had been aborted”’ (Glover 2001, 
p. 432). The older Glover astutely notes that the ethical question here relates not only to killing 
(whether by abortion or infanticide) but would be present even if the disabled person’s existence 
had been prevented by avoiding conception.  ‘Is anyone in a position to make the Godlike judgment: 
“it would have been better if you had not been conceived”?’ (Glover 2001, p. 433) The answer to this 
rhetorical question is answered by Watson with another, ‘If scientists don't play God, who will?’ 
(Darnovsky 2007) It is noteworthy that Watson associates godlike power to decide these issues not 
to all human beings in general or to society as a whole but specifically to ‘scientists’.  
While talk of ‘playing god’ is a commonplace among secular commentators it is nowhere to be found 
in any of the documents of the Vatican related to genetic engineering. Indeed the phrase seems 
never to have been used in any Papal statement or Vatican decree until 2008 when Pope Benedict 
used the phrase not in relation to science but to warn young people to beware ‘the cult of material 
possessions, the cult of possessive love and the cult of power’. More significantly, it is not only that 
the language of ‘playing god’ is omitted, but also reference to the fall narrative that underlies it 
(Genesis 3.1-24). This is rarely if ever applied to the analysis of GGE. Such reticence is common 
among Catholic moral theologians who tend to emphasise rather the power God has given to human 
beings to use intelligence and skill in the service of medicine. So, for example, Ashley and O’Rourke 
(1989, p. 302-303) criticise those who ‘question the extent of human dominion over nature’. In 
contrast they put forward two points: 
1. God is a generous Creator, who in creating human beings also called them by the gift of 
intelligence to share in his creative power. Consequently, God does not want human beings 
to leave fallow the talents he has given them, but encourages them to improve on the 
universe he has made. 
2. Such improvement is possible because theology can accept the idea that God has made an 
evolutionary universe in which the human race has been created through an evolutionary 
process that is not complete. This God has called humankind to join with him in bringing the 
universe to its completion, and in doing this, he has not made them mere workers to 
execute his orders or to add trifling original touches on their own. Rather, God has made 
then genuine co-workers and encourages them to exercise real creativity. 
The reference to evolution and the optimistic account of progress it embodies echo (perhaps 
consciously) the thought of Teilhard de Chardin. In this context it is interesting to note a weakness in 
this theologian which is also reflected in the two theological points which ground Ashley and 
O’Rourke’s discussion of GGE. They lack any reference to sin or the fall. It is as though Genesis 1-2 
were taken as an adequate basis for a Catholic theology of creation without the complement of 
Genesis 3. However, if Genesis 1.26 shows human beings as having God given dominion over the 
earth (and hence are ‘genuine co-workers’) Genesis 3.5 shows the serpent tempting Eve with the 
words, ‘you will be like God’. There is an irony here, well recognised by Augustine that the snake 
promises the couple something that would have been theirs, had they not sinned. However, ‘by 
aiming at more, a man is diminished, when he elects to be self-sufficient and defects from the one 
who is really sufficient for him’ (City of God XIV.13).  
A theology of creation without sufficient recognition of the fall leads to a celebration of the powers, 
strengths and excellences of human nature, as seen in human creativity, invention and the sciences. 
This theology coheres closely with Aristotle’s account of the aim of human life, to cultivate the 
virtues so as to flourish as an individual and in society. However, Alasdair MacIntyre (1999) has 
shown that this Aristotelian view, and much of the subsequent Western philosophical tradition, is 
myopic in relation to human dependence. In contrast, at this point Thomas Aquinas differs sharply 
from Aristotle: for whereas Aristotle regarded dependence on others as something to be ashamed 
of, Thomas, (here at his most Augustinian), regarded dependence as a key feature of human life and 
recognition of this feature as a key Christian virtue.  This is why humility is a vice for Aristotle and a 
virtue for Christians.  
Ashley and O’Rourke (1989, p. 304) cite an early article of MacIntyre (1979) in which he argues 
against eugenics (this short piece in some ways anticipates his later work (1999) on Dependent 
Rational Animals), but they do not relate his argument to theology. Instead they attempt to buttress 
it with an appeal to the long term risks of ‘polluting the gene pool with defects’ by GGE, especially 
those defects which might affect the brains of future people and hence compromise their 
intelligence. However, this invocation of fear of the future is in marked contrast to MacIntyre’s 
appeal to the virtue of humility, and the result is that the argument can easily be turned on its head. 
If the problem is ‘polluting the gene pool’ and if any ‘defect’ that would affect the brain would be 
‘disastrous’, then this is a powerful prima facie reason to intervene to prevent the birth of 
intellectually-disabled children. Hence Ashley and O’Rourke both reinforce fear of intellectual 
disability and make the evaluation of GGE contingent on its risks over and against its effectiveness in 
preventing disability. 
4. Unborn ghosts  
The unwillingness of Magisterial documents and of Catholic theologians such as Ashley and O’Rourke 
to invoke the fall narrative in relation to GGE is the concomitant of their celebration of the noble 
human enterprises of science and medicine. The use of technical knowledge and human skill are 
good in themselves and GGE cannot be condemned in principle simply because it involves human 
intervention in nature. Nor is there a problem altering the human body, if this is for the sake of the 
health of the body. This is a central element of ‘conventional medicine’ (here simply used to mean 
medicine but excluding at this point GGE, so as not to beg the question as to whether GGE is 
medicine in a wider sense). If GGE involves a disordered desire to ‘be like God’ (Genesis 3.5) this can 
only be because there is some intrinsic difference in intention or scope that both distinguishes GGE 
from conventional medicine and points to the underlying ethical problem.  
The distinction can perhaps be illustrated by exploring another theological issue that is raised by 
secular philosophers, and this relates to the problem of existence: 
‘The claim under consideration is that to be brought into existence with an extremely severe 
disability may not be in the best interest of a child. This entails a general problem of comparing 
existence with nonexistence. When medial techniques determine that some people rather than 
others come into existence, can those people be said to be better or worse off for the intervention?’ 
(Glover 2001, p. 439) 
That this question bears on theology properly speaking should be clear from a comparison on 
Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas. Aristotle, for all he was concerned with being qua being did not have 
a conception of creatio ex nihilo. In contrast, for Thomas Aquinas the fundamental metaphysical 
distinction between essence and existence was rooted not in the natural phenomenon of generation 
and corruption of material beings out of or into other material beings, but in the gratuitous Divine 
creation of all being (McCabe 2002). Where philosophers approach the question of being head on 
they are forced either to deny the reality of the problem or to acknowledge a sense of mystery. ‘It is 
not how things are in the world that is mystical, but that it exists.’ (Wittgenstein 6.44) 
In relation to the mysterious 'state of being unconceived' (Glover 2001, p. 439) there are indeed 
'slippery conceptual problems’ (p. 440) as is nicely illustrated by the following quotation from 
Richard Dawkins:  
We are going to die, and that makes us the lucky ones. Most people are never going to die because 
they are never going to be born. The potential people who could have been here in my place but 
who will in fact never see the light of day outnumber the sand grains of Arabia. Certainly those 
unborn ghosts include greater poets than Keats, scientists greater than Newton. We know this 
because the set of possible people allowed by our DNA so massively exceeds the set of actual 
people. In the teeth of these stupefying odds it is you and I, in our ordinariness, that are here. 
(Dawkins 1998, p. 1) 
Dawkins ‘unborn ghosts’ are not the souls of infants who have died in the womb, the fate of which 
has been a cause of speculation at least since the time of Augustine. He is rather speaking of the 
souls of those who have never been conceived. A similar comparison of the dead to the unborn 
occurs in the Hebrew Scriptures, though the Preacher takes a less sanguine view of the trials of being 
alive, ‘And I thought the dead who are already dead more fortunate than the living who are still 
alive; but better than both is he who has not yet been, and has not seen the evil deeds that are done 
under the sun.’ (Ecclesiastes 4.2-3) If we are to make the theology here explicit we might perhaps 
invoke the ancient Jewish story according to which every soul that would ever live was created in the 
first six days of creation. 
Each and every soul which shall be from Adam until the end of the world, was formed during the six 
days of Creation and was in paradise… At the time of conception God commands the angel who is 
the guardian of the spirits, saying: ‘Bring Me such a spirit which is in paradise and hath such a name 
and such a form’… God says to the soul, ‘the world into which you enter is more beautiful than this; 
and when I made you I intended you only for this drop of seed.’  
(Midrash Tanhuma Pekude, 3, see Ginzberg (1909-1938) in Jones 2004, p. 96) 
However, Dawkins unborn ghost are far more populous than those who ‘shall be from Adam to the 
end of the world’. The souls of the Midrash, like those the Preacher speaks of, who have ‘not yet 
been’ are numbered according to the actual future, whereas Dawkins unborn ghosts include 
everyone who could ever live, in every possible world, which Dawkins takes to be specified by every 
possible genetic make-up. But then again, how can we identify these people who could have lived 
but who did not and will not do so? It cannot be by the sequence of their genes, because we know 
that identical twins are distinct persons, and if I am cloned in the future that cloned individual will 
not be me. The number of possible persons is larger than the number of possible gene sequences. So 
how can future persons be identified? In the words of a well-known logician, ‘things that have 
existed do seem to be individually identifiable and discussable in a way in which things that don’t yet 
exist are not (the dead are metaphysically less frightening than the unborn)’ (Prior 1978, p. 171). 
Prior would perhaps find Dawkins unborn ghosts doubly metaphysically frightening. These are not 
the remains of persons who ‘have existed’; they are not even persons who ‘don’t yet exist’; they are 
only persons who ‘might have existed’.  
The identity problem of unborn ghosts is a conceptual problem for GGE if these interventions are 
characterised as therapeutic. In relation to conventional therapy we can ask how an intervention 
benefits or harms the patient. In what ways might he or she be better off, in what ways worse off? 
But who is the supposed beneficiary of GGE? At this point Glover is commendably clear in seeing 
that the choice in GGE, and eugenics in general, is not to alleviate the condition of someone with 
disability, but is to choose to conceive someone without disability rather than someone with 
disability, i.e. to choose ‘some people rather than others to come into existence’ (Glover 2001, p. 
439). This is a key point. If this is true, then GGE cannot be regarded as ‘therapeutic’ even when it 
targets pathological inherited conditions. Note that this point is not based on a strong link between 
genetics and identity. The inability to identify people who are ‘treated’ by GGE is based on the 
theological realisation that future people have not yet been created and there is a categorical 
difference between ministering to people who exist and seeking to create people with certain 
characteristics.iii   
This also shows why GGE is different from environmental action, public health interventions or 
working for posterity in a way that might benefit future generations.  In all these cases it is no part of 
the aim that certain people and not others should come into existence. I can build a park in the hope 
it benefits future generations whoever they may be, but when I intervene in the germline I am 
seeking to affect who will be in the park.  
Interestingly, the mystery of future persons causes paradoxes that are sufficiently grave to cause 
some utilitarians to reassess their premises. McMahan sees an impersonal utilitarian calculus as 
implying that ‘the failure to cause a person to exist is at least as bad as killing a person’ (McMahan 
2001, p. 471), a conclusion he regards as ‘plainly unacceptable’. Similarly, if all that mattered were 
total happiness, people would be ‘obligated to have many children in order to increase the total 
happiness’ (Glover 2001, p. 441; see also Parfit 1984 c. 17). To escape such repugnant conclusions, 
utilitarians such as Glover and McMahan argue for a ‘person-affecting’ utilitarianism. According to 
this, one’s aim should be ‘to make people happy not to make happy people’ (Glover 2001, p. 441). In 
annunciating this principle, Glover seems implicitly to acknowledge the value of the actual existing 
person. The same point is succinctly made by Helen Watt in her critique of eugenic abortion: it is 
‘bizarre to see a human life as a replaceable container of pleasure, as if it is the pleasure which is 
morally important, while the human being is not’ (Watt 2000, p. 75 citing Singer 1993, p. 186).  
At this juncture, it might be argued that, if GGE were achieved by interventions on gametes, it could 
be regarded as therapy on the parents, who are certainly identifiable actual persons. Perhaps the 
potential to pass on defective genes could be thought of as an illness in the parent. However, this 
move relies on a questionable understanding of procreation. It is right for parents to plan how and 
when they could best welcome and rear a child, if this is itself done in a virtuous way. However, it is 
wrong to think that a parent harms a child if the child inherits a condition from a parent. So equally it 
is wrong to hold, as eugenicists sometimes assert, that parents have a duty to conceive only healthy 
offspring. Rather than being a duty this seems to imply a conditional acceptance of the child which is 
the very contradiction of parenthood. It may of course be that therapy that benefits someone has a 
side-effect that it affects his or her future offspring (either for good or ill). However, the effect in 
GGE is not accidental. The aim is precisely to pass on healthy genes to a future child, so the intention 
is precisely not therapy for a parent but the health condition of the offspring, which returns us to the 
creation of future persons.  
It might be thought that while secular utilitarians such as Glover cannot identify individuals who 
would benefit from GGE, this problem could be solved if appeal is made to theological principles. If 
God can identity future persons who benefit for GGE then it can be understood as therapeutic. In 
this way, while there could be no secular justification for GGE, there could be a theological 
justification. This assumes that God knows not only what the future actually will be, but also of what 
the future would have been had certain actions been taken or had other actions not been taken and 
therefore can identify the people who would have existed. Just such a doctrine of God’s knowledge 
of ‘what would have happened if...’ was developed by Catholic theologians in the seventeenth 
century. The concept of is ‘middle knowledge’ (scientia media) was posited not to help guide moral 
theology but to explain the theology of grace and other problems of theodicy. The Jesuit theologian 
Lius de Molina, (see Pohle 1911) proposed that God gives grace to those who will use it well, and if 
God sometimes does not give grace, this is only because he knows that had the grace been given 
then in any case the person would not have used it well. Grace is always effective because God only 
gives it were it will be effective. A similar line of reasoning was used to explain the early deaths of 
children – these deaths spared the child from harm that would have come later in life.  
Even from the first this system was subject to severe criticism because, while it paid lip-service to 
the need for God’s grace, the emphasis was all on free will and God’s foreknowledge. In opposition 
to this approach other theologians, chiefly but not exclusively from the Order of Preachers, 
defended a more Augustinian reading of Thomas Aquinas according to which grace was given freely 
by God and not in accordance to foreseen merits. Eventually a Papal commission was formed to 
adjudicate the dispute (Congregatio de Auxiliis). It refused to condemn either party. Nevertheless, in 
its historical context, Molinism can be seen as symptomatic of the rationalism that characterised 
that era of Catholic theology. The doctrine of scientia media was a theological construct nicely 
designed to justify the actions of God. However, the knowledge it posited in God was a fancy 
without any determinate cause either in the actual future or the actual possibilities of the present. In 
the words of the philosopher Elizabeth Anscombe, ‘there [is] not, quite generally, any such thing as 
what would have happened if what did happen had not happened, and that in particular there [is] 
no such thing as what someone would have done if… and certainly that there [is] no such thing as 
how someone would have spent his life if he had not died as a child.’ (Anscombe 1983, p. vii) The 
history of Molinism thus provides a theological reduction ad absurdum for the view that GGE is 
therapeutic because God can identify the ‘would have been disabled’ persons who would benefit. 
There are no such ‘would have been’ persons because there are no definite set of identifiable 
persons that God ‘would have created’.  
A preliminary theological analysis suggests that GGE is ‘playing god’ precisely because it involves a 
use of power not to help actual persons in need but to create or select future persons of a particular 
kind. Such an attempt itself involves some ‘eugenic’ determination of the worthwhileness of the 
lives of future persons, based on their genetic characteristics. It is this feature of eugenics, the 
intention to improve or purify the human genetic stock, that is the root of its viciousness. G.K. 
Chesterton famously compared eugenics to witch-burning. He remarked that he was not sceptical of 
the existence of witches, but he was sceptical of witch-finders. The attempt to eradicate an evil 
‘degenerated into a rabid and despicable persecution of the feeble or the old. It ended by being a 
war upon the weak.’ (Chesterton 1922, p. 64) The same can be said of eugenics. There is suffering in 
disability but eugenics represents an attempt to eradicate this evil by eliminating disabled people, 
and this inevitably brings forth persecution. If eugenics has historically given rise to many other evils, 
discrimination, compulsory sterilisation, discarding of human embryos, killing of born and unborn 
infants, it must be asked whether these are accidental features, or rather, symptomatic of a deeper 
problem. In the words of Jesus, ‘the tree is known by its fruit’ (Matthew 12.22). Germ-line genetic 
engineering is thus theologically problematic because of the intention it embodies. 
5. Human identity, procreation, and the need for further theological analysis  
The analysis given here is not dependent on a strong link between genotype and personal identity. 
Even without demonstrating such a link, one can recognise that GGE is not an attempt at therapy but 
an attempt to ‘play god’ by determining the qualities of future persons. Nevertheless, the question 
of personal identity is also significant and calls for further theological analysis. Human beings derive 
their individual identity at least in part from the circumstances and conditions of their origin. From a 
theological perspective this identity of origin is an expression of God’s act of creation. It is God who 
creates the human person and fashions him or her in the womb. It is God who creates the soul of 
that person when the human being is conceived. Human conception is most commonly from a fusion 
of two gametes each contributing to the new and unique genotype.iv Furthermore, as well as 
representing what is individual in each person, the human genome also represents what is common 
to all human beings, a shared inheritance. This also connects to a profound theological theme, the 
unity of the human family in Adam and in Christ as sharing a common nature and ultimate end.  
One possible theological defence of GGE is that it is not therapy of an individual but therapy of 
human nature, just as Christ therapized human nature.v However, this comparison shows even more 
vividly how GGE represents an attempt to play god, for it is surely only God who creates human 
nature and only God who can heal that nature. It is this attempt to reshape humanity itself, implicit 
in GGE, which has caused the unease among the nations.  
The recent scientific proposal that nonhuman genes be inserted into human embryos sharpens the 
issue of human identity, for what is at stake is not only personal identity but species identity. In this 
context Nicholas Tonti-Filippini has argued that the introduction even of a single gene threatens 
human identity. Certainly GGE with non-human genes represents a radical affront to our shared 
humanity. This could be characterised as the ‘sacredness’ of the human genome but it is perhaps 
better understood as the sacredness of a process, the process of procreation whereby this shared 
humanity is passed on. Introducing nonhuman genes into human beings is ‘an offense against the 
sacredness of the generative faculty that subsists in the human genome’ (Tonti-Filippini 2006, 703). 
The theology of the genome should thus be related to the theology of procreation, the unity of man 
and woman as one flesh, the theology of the body and the theology of marriage. Understood in this 
way, GGE is problematic because the plan to have children of such and such a kind represents a very 
different relationship of parent to child than that understood by a Catholic view of marriage and 
procreation. It represents not an attempt to create a good environment to nurture a child, but an 
attempt to determine the identity or nature of the child. This direct manipulation of the genetic 
identity of the child-to-be is unaccepting of the child as gift: GGE embodies a desire for control that 
one might call ‘non-conjugal’ or ‘non-procreative’.  Thus even if GGE could be achieved without 
resort to IVF, it retains the same desire for control, that same reduction of procreation to 
reproduction, that is found in IVF.     
Conclusion 
It has been argued here that contemporary Magisterial Catholic discussions of germ-line genetic 
engineering add little to secular accounts. Discussions of this issue seem to exemplify a weakness in 
contemporary Roman Catholic moral theology more generally. In contrast secular discussion of GGE 
itself raises theological questions. This article has drawn out some theological themes that suggest 
the presence of an intrinsic ethical objection to GGE, even were it to be safe, even were it not to 
involve IVF, and even were it confined to inherited conditions which were pathological. There seems 
to be a deeper theological problem. Nevertheless, the aim of this article is not to foreclose 
discussion but rather to demonstrate the pressing need for further theological analysis of GGE within 
the Catholic moral tradition so that official Magisterial teaching on the question can be better 
informed. This is a great undertaking which has hardly begun.  
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i Catholic teaching on the body and the principles related to human life and human sexuality could, of course, 
provide a rich theological basis for an analysis of GGE. The point being made is only that thus far the 
documents of the Magisterium that deal explicitly with GGE do not show the same depth of theological 
reflection as those dealing with, for example, human life or sexuality.   
ii As the understanding of ‘the sources of Revelation’ also suffers if Scripture and Tradition are ‘separated from’ 
dogmatic theology or from the Magisterium.  
iii Parfit (1984, p. 355) argues that ‘On all of the plausible views…You were conceived at a certain time. It is in 
fact true that, if you had not been conceived within a month of that time, you would not have existed.’ This 
illustrates how dependent identity is on contingent circumstances, but our point is a more radical theological 
one, that God creates identity.    
iv The exception to this rule is the conception of identical twins not by fusion but by fission. So it is not strictly 
necessary for personal identity that a genotype is unique. Nevertheless each person has a genotype which is 
properly his or hers and which that person has from the first moment of his or her existence.     
v I am indebted to Corinna Delkeskamp-Hayes for this example. 
